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-

AN EMPLOYER DOES NOT COMMIT AN UNFAIR LABOR

PRACTICE WHEN, SUBSEQUENT TO AN IMPASSE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, HE LOCKS OUT

His

REGULAR EMPLOYEES AND OPERATES

WITH TEMPORARY REPLACEMENTS.

Inter-CollegiatePress v. NLRB (8th Cir. 1973)
After reaching an impasse during collective bargaining with Local
No. 60 of the International Brotherhood of Bookbinders, the employer,
Inter-Collegiate Press, in an effort to bolster its economic bargaining
power, locked out all employees in the bargaining units represented by the
union.1 When no agreement appeared forthcoming, the employer informed
the union that it would begin hiring temporary replacements unless a
contract were signed or a no-strike commitment given by a specified date
antecedent to the company's busy season. 2 Immediately thereafter, the
company hired replacements, resumed full production, and continued the
lockout until the busy season passed, at which time it offered to reinstate
all locked out employees. 3 Responding to charges filed by the union, the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued
a complaint charging the employer with violations of sections 8(a) (1)
1. Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974). The impasse was reached after expiration of the existing
employment contract, negotiations on the terms of a new agreement having begun
two months prior to the scheduled termination of the contract. Fourteen bargaining
sessions were held before a federal mediator declared that additional discussion would
be futile. When the union rejected the employer's last contract proposal, which offered
better terms than those in the expired agreement, but did not make a counterproposal,
the management locked out all employees represented by the union. The National
Labor Relations Board (the Board) and the parties stipulated that the lockout was
legal at its inception. 486 F.2d at 841.
A duty to bargain in good faith is imposed upon both the employer and the
union by section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter the Act],
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970), and section 8(b) (3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3)
(1970). See, e.g., In re Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). See also Cox, The
Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401 (1958). Because of the unilateral characteristic of a lockout, there exists a question as to whether an impasse
in the collective bargaining - the parties refusing in good faith to accede to each
other's demands - is a prerequisite to a lawful lockout by an individual employer.
In both American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), a leading case in
this area wherein the Supreme Court held that an employer's institution of a lockout
after a bargaining impasse had been reached was not an unfair labor practice, and
the instant case, a bargaining impasse had been reached, making resolution of the
question unnecessary. For discussions taking the position that an impasse is not a
prerequisite, see Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; Detroit Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965).
2. 486 F.2d at 843. The company was engaged in the highly seasonal business
of printing scholastic yearbooks and graduation announcements. Consequently, any
disruption in production during its peak period would seriously affect the company's
ability to meet its guaranteed delivery schedules. Id. at 842.
3. Id. at 843. The company informed the union and the employees that the substitutes were to be employed only for the duration of the labor dispute, and in any
event, the replacements would be discharged at the end of the busy season. Id.
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and 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). 4 The Board,
reversing the administrative law judge, held that the employer's conduct
was not proscribed by the Act and dismissed the complaint. 5 The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit enforced the Board's order, holding that
where a bargaining impasse existed, the employer did not violate the Act
by hiring temporary replacements to continue operations during an otherwise lawful lockout. Inter-CollegiatePress v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974).
Section 8(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act" provides protection for union
employees' section 7 rights7 from unfair labor practices on the part of the
employer. Among those employer practices which could be held illegal under
the Act are lockouts accompanied by the use of replacement employees. The
history of the Board's treatment of lockouts evidences its reluctance to
permit indiscriminate use of the device, as lockouts have been sanctioned
only when specific requirements were satisfied. For example, lockouts
had been permitted in both multi-employer and individual employer situations, but only as a defensive measure, not a bargaining tactic.8 However,
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1970). The Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a), which amended the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970), provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights

Id.

guaranteed in section 7 . . .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....

5. Inter-Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 81 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1972),
enforced, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974).
6. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1970). For the text of the pertinent provisions of the Act, see note 4 supra.
7. The employee rights referred to in section 8(a) (1) are those contained in
the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970),
which provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all such activities ....
Id. The rights afforded by section 7 shall hereinafter be referred to as section 7 rights,
employee rights or protected rights.
8. When initially confronted with the issue of the propriety of the lockout, the
Board found it unlawful. See, e.g., Continental Baking Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 143 (1953),
enforcement denied, 221 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1955). However, the Board carved out
an exception for the case in which not all members of a multi-employer bargaining
unit were struck. As a defensive measure to combat the union's attempt to chip
away at the cohesiveness of the employers in the bargaining unit, these non-struck
employers could lock out their employees. This departure was rationalized on the
basis of the employers' interest in maintaining the integrity of the multi-employer
bargaining unit. See Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), enforceinent denied sub norn. Teamsters Local 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). Where an individual employer was concerned, a lockout
was permissible only as a defensive tactic. Circumstances justifying the single employer's lockout included those in which there validly existed the desire to avoid
extraordinary operational or economic losses. See, e.g., Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. 268 (1951) ; Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
Whether a member of a multi-employer bargaining unit or an individual employer was involved, an express strike threat or an implicit one - such as that in a
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/3
strike against one member of the multi-employer unit - was necessary in order for

2

Newell: Labor Law - An Employer Does Not Commit an Unfair Labor Practice
JUNE

1974]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

in 1965, in American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 9 the United States

Supreme Court held that offensive bargaining lockouts were not prohibited
by sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the Act. Nevertheless, the Court left
unanswered the question of the propriety of the use of replacement labor
during an offensive lockout.' 0 Furthermore, in the same year, the Court
approved the use of substitute labor in a defensive lockout by non-struck
members of a multi-employer bargaining unit, in NLRB v. Brown."
With respect to the issue left unresolved by both of these decisions whether the utilization of temporary replacements by a single employer
during an offensive lockout constituted an unfair labor practice - the
present Board is not in complete internal agreement: two members maintain that such employer conduct is legitimate,'1 2 two others view the practice as unlawful,' 3 while another member prefers to operate on a case-bycase basis, paying particular attention to the interaction of the particular
facts. 14 Two courts have indicated agreement with the view held by the
first two Board members without discussing the issue extensively.' Only
the Board to allow the employer the benefit of the lockout. For a presentation of the
Board's attitude toward the lockout as a lawful device only where the employer was

the non-aggressor, see Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an
Old Terrain,28 U. Cal. L. REv. 614 (1961).
Even where the Board permitted a lockout, it was unwilling to allow the employer to hire replacements. See, e.g., Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962),
enforcemnent denied sub. nom. NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), aft'd,
380 U.S. 278 (1965). While sanctioning the lockout engaged in by non-struck employers of a multi-employer bargaining unit, the Board denied them the right to hire
temporary replacements. Id.

9. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).

10. See id. at 318. The Court stated:
[W]e intimate no view whatever as to the consequences which would follow had
the employer replaced its employees with permanent replacements or even temporary help.
Id. at 308 n.8 (citation omitted).
11. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
12. Board Members Kennedy and Penello have found the use of substitutes in
the context of an otherwise lawful lockout not violative of the Act. See Ozark Steel
Fabricators, Inc., 199 N.L.tRB. No. 136, 81 L.R.R.M. 1501, 1504 (1972); InterCollegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 81 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1972), enforced, 486 F.2d
837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974) ; Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B.
No. 53, 80 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1405-06 (1972), enforced, 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
13. Adhering to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB,
440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971), Members Fanning and
Jenkins have stated that combining the use of substitutes with a lockout violates the
Act per se. See Ozark Steel Fabricators, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 81 L.R.R.M.
1501, 1502 (1972) (Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting) ; Inter-Collegiate Press, 199
N.L.R.B. No. 35, 81 L.R.R.M. 1508, 1512 (1972) (Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting),
enforced, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974) ; Ottawa
Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 80 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1408 (1972) (Fanning & Jenkins,
dissenting), enforced, 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
14. See Ozark Steel Fabricators, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 81 L.R.R.M. 1501,
1501 n.3 (1972) (Miller, concurring) ; Inter-Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 35,
81 L.R.R.M. 1508, 1510 (1972) (Miller, dissenting), enforced, 486 F.2d 837 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974) ; Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 53,
80 L.R.R.M. 1404, 1408 (1972) (Miller, concurring), enforced, 482 F.2d 945 (6th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974). Chairman Miller engages in a balancing
test, weighing the impact of the employer's conduct on union membership against the
employer's asserted business justification. See Inter-Collegiate Press, supra, 81
L.R.R.M. at 1510-11.
15. InVillanova
Ottawa University
Silica Co.Charles
v. NLRB,
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945 Digital
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the Seventh Circuit, in Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB,' 6 has provided a
relatively detailed analysis of this question, concluding that the use of replacement labor during an offensive lockout constituted an unfair labor
practice per se. 17 The Inland Trucking court examined the employer's
conduct under both section 8(a) (1) and section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
According to that court, the use of temporary replacements violated section
8(a) (1) in that it interfered with the employees' section 7 collective bargaining rights by enabling the employer to remain in business, instead of
making the lockout a test of the employer's and employees' respective
abilities to withstand the cessation of business.' Regarding possible violation of section 8(a) (3), which prohibits conduct by the employer that
discourages union membership, 19 the court applied the standard set forth
by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 20 concluding

that the employer's offensive lockout and use of temporary replacements
was "inherently destructive" of employee rights. 21 In addition, even if the
resulting harm to such rights had been slight, the employer had failed to
furnish a legitimate and substantial business justification. 22 Consequently,
the employer's actions constituted an unfair labor practice under the
Great Dane standard.
Great Dane provided the most helpful statement of the standards to
be applied to any employer conduct alleged to be in violation of section
8(a) (3),2 3 and thus was the appropriate test for determining whether the
use of temporary replacements in an offensive lockout was an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a) (3). The Great Dane test depends upon the
characterization of employer conduct as having had either an "inherently
destructive" or a "comparatively slight" effect upon important employee
rights. 24 Anti-union motivation can be a factor in this determination. 2G
In general, the Board's General Counsel has the burden of showing that
merely enforced the Board's finding that the use of temporary replacements during a
lockout was not an unfair labor practice. Id. The Ninth Circuit has indicated in dicta
that the hiring of temporary replacements was not a violation of the Act. NLRB v.
Golden State Bottling Co., 401 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1965), citing NLRB v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278 (1965).
16. 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
17. 440 F.2d at 565.
18. Id. at 564.
19. See note 4 supra.
20. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
21. 440 F.2d at 565.
22. Id.
23. In Great Dane, the employer had violated section 8(a) (3) by refusing to
pay striking employees vacation benefits accrued after announcing it would pay such
benefits to replacements, non-strikers, and any returning strikers. 388 U.S. at 27-30.
24. The Great Dane test is as follows:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct
was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even
if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business
considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on
employee rights is "comparatively slight," an anti-union motivation must be
proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of

legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct. Thus, in either
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/3

situation, once it has been proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory
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the employer has engaged in unlawful conduct. The Great Dane Court,
however, determined the following: Once the Board's General Counsel
established that the conduct caused some harm to employee rights, whether
"inherently destructive" or lesser in degree, the employer had the burden
of justifying his actions by affirmative evidence of the existence of some
legitimate and substantial business purpose. If the employer met this
burden, then evidence of anti-union motivation, independent of the challenged conduct, would still be material as evidence of a section 8(a) (3)
infraction.2 However, where the employer's conduct resulted in severe
harm to employee rights - conduct "inherently destructive" - the Board
could readily reject any purported business justification and decide that
there had been an unfair labor practice.
Although the Great Dane case involved an alleged violation of section
8(a) (3), the Supreme Court has indicated that the Great Dane principles
are applicable in determining whether section 8(a) (1) has been violated
conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent, the

burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate
objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him.
Id. at 34.
25. Id. An employer's anti-union motivation, when established by evidence independent of the conduct challenged as objectionable, operates to convert an otherwise
ordinary business action into an unfair labor practice. Id. The Supreme Court has
stated :
Though the intent necessary for an unfair labor practice may be shown in different
ways, proving it in one manner may have far different weight and far different
consequences than proving it in another. When specific evidence of a subjective
intent to discourage or to discriminate or to encourage or discourage union membership is shown, and found, many otherwise innocent or ambiguous actions which
are normally incident to the conduct of a business may without more, be converted into unfair labor practices .... Conduct which on its face appears to serve
legitimate business ends in these cases is wholly impeached by the showing of
intent to encroach upon protected rights. The employer's claim of legitimacy is
totally dispelled.
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1963) (citations and footnote
omitted). In determining whether a lockout is an unfair labor practice, the employer's
motive is a relevant topic of inquiry. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380
U.S. 300, 311-13 (1965).
26. 388 U.S. at 34. See note 24 supra. While the status of the law of motive the rule concerning when evidence of the employer's subjective motive must be shown
and which party has the burden of proof on the issue -- was clarified in American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), and in NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278
(1965), it was subsequently obfuscated by Great Dane. See generally Janofsky, New
Concepts in Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy of
American Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1970).
It should be noted that the statutory language of section 8(a) (1), in contrast to that
contained in section 8(a) (3), does not require the existence of scienter before an
unfair labor practice can be found. See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 739 (1961).
See also American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313 (1965); NLRB v.
Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). The Court's involvement with the employer's subjective motive in dealing with the section 8(a) (1) charge in both American
Ship Bldg., supra, and NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S..278 (1965), reveals that one could
argue that, in this regard, derivative, not independent, section 8(a) (1) violations were
alleged. In each of these cases, the Court's inquiry into the possible anti-union motive
of the employer shows that in the lockout context, a finding of a section 8(a) (3)
violation should result in a derivative violation of section 8(a) (1). Regarding the
interplay between sections 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (1); see geterally Oberer, The Scienter
Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive,
Published
Villanova
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as well. 27 Hence, in the instant case, the court relied upon the Great Dane
test to determine whether either section 8(a) (1) or section 8(a) (3) had
been violated. Although the union cited Inland Trucking as support for
its contention that the employer's use of temporary replacement labor
during an otherwise lawful, offensive lockout conclusively constituted an
unfair labor practice,2 8 the Inter-Collegiate Press court expressly rejected
the Seventh Circuit's per se approach. Noting the fact that the court's
standard for review of the Board's order was the "substantial evidence"
test, 29 the court believed it improper to hold that the employer's conduct

was absolutely "inherently destructive" of employees' rights, especially
since the Board itself had not promulgated a per se rule.3 0 Besides, the
court wrote, such a strict interpretation would conflict with Justice Goldberg's admonition to the contrary in American Ship Building.31 In addition, the court found no indication of anti-union hostility on the part of
the employer,3 2 thereby closing one potential avenue by which an unfair
labor practice can be proved pursuant to the Great Dane test.
In response to the allegation of a section 8(a) (3) violation, the court
observed that the probable impact of a lockout would be on the union's
bargaining position rather than on the employees' loyalty to the union. 33
Hence, the focus of the court's thinking was on this former effect as well
as the possible deterrent to union membership literally proscribed by that
section. Viewing the facts of the case, the court found that the evidence
indicated neither that the union's position as bargaining representative
for the locked out workers had been jeopardized, nor that the union had
been damaged in its ability to effectively represent those comprising the
bargaining unit as a whole. As further evidence of absence of harm, the
court noted that there was no indication that any worker who did return
27. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967).
28. 486 F.2d at 840.
29. Id. at 840. The "substantial evidence test" is the epithet used to refer to that
scope of review which the federal courts apply to the decisions of administrative
agencies, such as the NLRB. Under the substantial evidence test, reviewing courts
decide questions of law, but limit themselves in passing on issues of fact to deciding
whether there is a rational basis for the administrative body's finding. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). For a fuller discussion of the
judicial scope of review accorded to decisions of administrative agencies, see K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 525-44 (3d ed. 1972).

30. 486 F.2d at 840-41.
31. Id. at 841, quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 337-38
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
32. 486 F.2d at 845. From the court's opinion it is unclear whether these facts
were reviewed as evidence of an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (1) or section
8(a) (3), or both. One possible cause for this lack of clarity in the court's language
might be that the court was tacitly applying the concept of derivative violation of
section 8(a) (1), whereby violations of other sections of the Act are held necessarily
to impinge upon section 7 rights, and therefore found separate discussion of the
two sections unnecessary. The legislative history of section 8(a) justifies such an
application of subsection (1), as it indicates that that subsection protects employees'
section 7 rights against the same unfair labor practices which subsections (2) through
(5) specifically prohibit, while independently providing broader protection against
employer conduct not explicitly disallowed by any of these other four subdivisions.
See H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935) ; S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1935).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/3
33. 486 F.2d at 845.
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had repudiated his union membership. 34 Thus the use of temporary employees had had a "comparatively slight" effect on section 7 rights.3 5 Furthermore, the court found a substantial business justification for the
employer's action in that it was engaged in a highly seasonal business.
Because of the disruption in operations which had been caused by a strike
during the previous busy season and the subsequent dissatisfaction of
customers with the interruption, the court was satisfied that the union
strategy was to continue to work without a contract until the time when
a strike would be most effective.3 6
With respect to the alleged violation of section 8(a) (1), again the
court determined in effect that the employer's response to the bargaining
impasse was not "inherently destructive" of employee rights.37 In order
to make out a violation of that section's provisions, one must demonstrate
that the employer has interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees
in their exercise of a protected right. 3 The union's premise was that
unlawful coercion is inherent where employees are deprived of their incomes while the company is not shut down.3 9 The court acknowledged
that coercion is present when an employer prevents its employees from
working, and admitted that the coercion may in fact be intensified when
the employer hires temporary employees to continue operations. 40 While
the presence of employer-induced coercion could not be denied, the court
perceived the real issue to be the propriety of the end which the coercion
was directed to achieve. In other words, a mere finding of coercion without
more was insufficient to make out a section 8(a) (1) violation: the coercion
must have inhibited a section 7 right. 41 The instant opinion drew a distinction between conduct aimed at securing sufficient economic advantage
to the employer within the collective bargaining framework and conduct
pursued to deter the exercise of section 7 rights. 42 Consequently, there
34. Id.
35. Id. The Inter-Collegiate Press court found a combination of three factors
influential in determining that the conduct involved resulted in but a slight impact

on employee rights. First, the replacements were hired for the duration of the labor
dispute only, and in any event, they would be discharged after the culmination of the
busy season. The union was made aware of both these facts. Second, the option to
resume their positions was available to locked-out employees if they would accede
to the employer's terms, which terms were superior to those found in the expired
contract. Third, the employer had agreed before the lockout to retain the unionsecurity clause from the former contract. Id., citing NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,
288-89 (1965).
36. 486 F.2d at 843, 845.
37. Although the court did not use the terms "inherently destructive" or "slight
effect" in its discussion of the alleged violation of section 8(a) (1), it is submitted
that this was the conclusion reached, especially in view of the fact that the court
stated that the Great Dane test was applicable to a section 8(a) (1) violation. See
486 F.2d at 844. The failure to use those terms, however, might indicate that the
court had also been speaking of section 8(a) (1) during its apparent discussion of
section 8(a) (3). See 486 F.2d at 844-45.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970). See note 4 supra.
39. 486 F.2d at 845-46.
40. Id. at 846.
41. See id. at 846. See also American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308
(1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965).
42. 486 F.2d at 846, qioting American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
309 (1965).

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 6 [1974], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 19

had been only a slight effect on employee rights, an effect justified in view
43
of the seasonal nature of the employer's business.
The difference in the results reached by the instant court and the
Inland Trucking court stemmed from their initial categorization of the
behavior as having either a slight or a severe impact upon employee rights
under sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3). As noted by the Inter-Collegiate
Press court, "the phrase 'inherently destructive' is not easily susceptible of
precise definition." 44 In the context of an employer's awarding seniority
credits to replacement employees, the phrase has been described as conduct "which does speak for itself - it is discriminatory and it does
discourage union members and whatever the claimed overriding justification may be, it carries with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended. '45 It has been
suggested that the proper procedure to follow in deciding whether conduct is "inherently destructive" is that which simultaneously analyzes
both the effect upon section 7 rights and the employer's business justification. 46 However, the literal language in Great Dane requires the making
of a series of determinations dependent upon specified conditions. 47 Applying this sequential test to substantially identical facts, the courts of the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits arrived at opposite conclusions on the question whether section 8(a) (1) and section 8(a) (3) had been violated.
With regard to a violation of section 8(a) (3), which prohibits discriminatory employment practices for the purpose of affecting membership
in a labor organization, it is arguable that supplanting permanent workers
who have been locked out with temporary replacements intentionally dis48
criminates against those replaced employees who are union members.
While this argument has a certain logical appeal under the language of
this section, it appears inconsistent with the recognized right to fill vacancies created by strikers with permanent replacements. 49 Since both the
lockout and the strike are regarded as legitimate economic weapons, the
fact that in a lockout the employer precipitates the vacancies should not
invariably lead to the conclusion that the employer has engaged in discrimination. In addition, if, as in Inter-Collegiate Press, the employer
43. 486 F.2d at 847.
44. Id. at 844-45.
45. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963) (emphasis in original).
46. The argument has been made that where conflicting interests are involved,
it is better policy to analyze the effect on employee rights and the justification
for the employer's conduct simultaneously, before attempting to characterize the employer's conduct. See Janofsky, supra note 26, at 99. Before a new procedure was
instituted by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26,
34 (1967), conduct was not characterized in the abstract, but rather a balancing test
was utilized whereby employees' section 7 rights were weighed against the employer's
legitimate business interests. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29
(1963); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957). See also American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
47. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). See note 24 supra.
48. The employer's conduct in replacing union employees with non-union personnel
was the salient factor in the Seventh Circuit's finding that the employer had violated
section 8(a) (3). Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/3
49. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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uniformly locks out all members of the collective bargaining unit, both
union and non-union members alike, there is strong objective evidence
that the employer was seeking to gain a tactical advantage within the bargaining process and not in derogation of it. Moreover, precedent indicates
that the Supreme Court may be willing to hold the hiring of substitutes
lawful. As noted at the outset of this discussion, in American Ship Building Co., the Court held that an offensive lockout did not violate section
8(a) (3), and in Brown it also approved the defensive lockout with substitutions in the context of a multi-employer bargaining unit's reaction
to a whipsaw strike. 50 In the latter case, the Court stated, "[W]e do not
see how the continued operations of respondents and their use of temporary
replacements imply hostile motivation any more than the lockout itself; nor
do we see how they are inherently more destructive of employee rights." 5 1
However, the question unanswered in both of these decisions, but dealt
with in both Inland Trucking and Inter-Collegiate Press, is that of the
appropriateness of the employer's use of substitution as a positive bargaining tool or economic weapon. Such conduct should not be found to be
inherently discriminatory because, as was suggested by one Board member,
little is gained by retaining the distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" conduct. 52 Even if this distinction is not abandoned, employer
conduct should not be viewed as discriminatory where there is inconclusive evidence on the question of whether permitting the employer's use of
53
replacements actually served to improperly influence union membership.
The explanation for the variation between the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits' respective reasoning on the issue of a violation of section 8(a) (1)
lies in the former court's interpretation in Inland Trucking that continued
operation after a lockout inescapably gives rise to the inference that the
action was intended to damage the employees' abilities to engage in con50. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra. A whipsaw strike is a strike directed
against fewer than all members of a multi-employer bargaining unit, designed to intensify competitive pressure on the struck member by allowing other members to
continue to operate. The goal of the union is to force each member to terms individually by a succession of such strikes. It is thought that terms of the agreements
will be more favorable to the union by striking in a sequential manner. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. National Ry. Labor Conf., 310 F. Supp. 905, 910 n.5
(D.D.C. 1970), appeal dismissed, 463 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The employers'
interest in maintaining the integrity of their bargaining unit has been protected to the
extent of allowing non-struck members to lock out their regular employees and continue
operations with temporary replacements. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
51. 380 U.S. at 284.
52. Board Chairman Miller, in his dissenting opinion in Inter-Collegiate Press,
199 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 81 L.RR.M. 1508, 1510-12 (1972) (Miller, dissenting), was
doubtful whether the Board's use of the traditional terms "offensive" and "defensive"
had continued vitality in light of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements. Id.
at 1511. This sentiment was endorsed by the Eighth Circuit's recognition of the
limited utility of a pro forma application of labels. See 486 F.2d at 844.
53. Because of the procedural consequences associated with a conclusion that
employer conduct is "inherently destructive" (see notes 24-26 and accompanying text
supra), such a conclusion should be made only in the clearest of circumstances. That
an employer's use of replacements is ambiguous behavior is a notion buttressed by the
dearth of litigation on the issue, as well as by the opposite conclusions reached by
the
Seventh
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certed activities.14 Therefore, no inquiry into the employer's subjective
motive need be undertaken by the General Counsel, nor must a business
justification be accepted as a vindication of the behavior. In contrast, the
Eighth Circuit in Inter-CollegiatePress did not construe the coercion as
having had a meaningful effect on section 7 rights. While the conduct
may have significantly affected the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement finally reached, it had no more than a slight impact on the
collective bargaining process. 5 However, prior to either of these decisions,
the Supreme Court, in American Ship Building, had decided that the use
of a lockout in support of a legitimate bargaining position was not inconsistent with either the right to strike or the right to bargain collectively.5"
Within this framework, then, the Inter-Collegiate Press court's reasoning
that the hiring of substitutes "does no more than increase the pressure
upon the employees to settle the dispute, while perhaps easing the pressure
on the employer, '5 7 is merely a logical extension of the American Ship
Building doctrine. This amount of pressure is no greater than that resulting from other practices sanctioned during a bargaining lockout; hence,
the use of temporary replacements should be viewed as merely an additional weapon in the employer's arsenal with which to confront the union's
demands. 5 Under this view, the Inter-CollegiatePress court's refusal to
find a section 8(a) (1) infraction was correct, because the employer was
resisting the union's bargaining demands, not the legitimacy of the collective bargaining process or the employees' opportunity to engage in
concerted activity.
54. See 440 F.2d at 565. It is submitted that this viewpoint was the result of
the court's interpretation of the manner in which the Act is intended to protect the
right to strike. Under the Inland Trucking court's view, the union was to be the
only judge of the circumstances in which the employer was to be permitted to operate
with substitute employees. If the employer were to be permitted to substitute at all,
it would be solely for the union, by striking after having considered its tactical
position, to create the precondition which would allow the employer to hire replacements pursuant to NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Under
such a view, then, because of the Act's protection of the right to strike and the
court's interpretation of the scope of that right, the employer would be prohibited
from operating its business with substitutes. Cf. 440 F.2d at 564.
55. See 486 F.2d at 846, quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
300, 309. Cf. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495-96 (1960).
56. Indeed, it was argued to the Eighth Circuit, in a brief filed amicus curiae
by the United States Chamber of Commerce, that the lockout is the employer's counterpart to the union's right to strike. The court did not dwell on the question presented,
correctly stating that its resolution would not answer the pertinent question of the
permissible scope of a lockout. 486 F.2d at 846-47.
57. Id. at 846.
58. According to the Inter-Collegiate Press court, the use of the lockout with
temporary replacements exerted no more pressure than that applied by other valid
employer tactics used during a bargaining lockout, such as stockpiling or subcontracting (see American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965)) or shifting
production to alternate plants (see Ruberoid Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 987 (1967)). 486
F.2d at 846.
It is submitted that the court should have been far more precise in determining where on the continuum between legitimate conduct and inherently destructive
employer conduct the hiring of temporary replacements lies, and should have further
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/3
articulated the reasoning behind that determination.
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Although both courts purported to conform59 to the Supreme Court's
declaration in American Ship Building that once an employer's conduct
is deemed an economic weapon, its effectiveness should not be balanced
against union tactics to determine whether it constitutes an unfair labor
practice, 60 each court nonetheless utilized this analysis. 61 The reversion
to a balancing approach is not surprising when one considers the difficulty
of designating conduct as an unfair labor practice under the nebulous
standard of " 'inherently destructive' of section 7 rights."'62 Such a determination cannot be made in a vacuum; some comparison of the employer's
and employees' interests is required in each case. Thus, it is submitted,
despite the courts' desire to comply with the Supreme Court's warning
against balancing bargaining weapons, such balancing in fact occurred,
albeit at an earlier stage, that of determining whether the conduct was
"inherently destructive" or valid as a bargaining weapon. Hence, if a
reviewing court employing this method were to perceive the effect of the
challenged tactic upon employees' section 7 rights to be of a magnitude
sufficient to render the union members substantially helpless in combatting
the tactic and its effect, it would find the employer conduct "inherently
destructive" of the right to engage in concerted activities and would not
designate the conduct a valid bargaining weapon.63
Despite the Inter-Collegiate Press court's explicit denial that it was
weighing analogous bargaining tactics, 64 and the fact that it specifically
59. See 486 F.2d at 847; 440 F.2d at 564.
60. See 380 U.S. at 317. See also NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S.
477, 497-98 (1960).
61. It has been suggested that in Inland Trucking, the court in so doing did no
more than withdraw from the employer an economic weapon thought too potent, in an
attempt to thereby equalize the parties' respective bargaining strengths. See 85 HARV.
L. REV. 680, 685 (1972). This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Seventh
Circuit conceded therein that a simple lockout was permissible and that the only apparent effect of the addition of temporary replacements was increased pressure against
the union's bargaining demands. 440 F.2d at 563-64. See 85 HARV. L. REV. at 685.
62. In denominating employer conduct "inherently destructive," the Supreme
Court has been proceeding on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
63. It has been argued logically that "in those situations where it is inherent in
the collective bargaining process that one of the parties is virtually helpless and at
the mercy of the other party, the Board is authorized to prohibit conduct that will
give one party such overwhelming power if the language of any section of the Act
provides a rational vehicle for striking this balance." Schatzki, The Employer's
UnilateralAct - A Per Se Violation - Sometimes, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 470, 485 (1966).
While it may be a valid argument that the Board in this context has the power under
the Act to be the arbiter of the use of economic weapons where the balance of power
in collective bargaining may be so severely upset, it is submitted that, in this situation
also, the determination of the question of whether employer conduct is inherently
destructive of employee rights is one to be entrusted to the court for decision as a
matter of law. If that were the case, on review of a Board decision, a court would
not be confined to applying the substantial evidence test. See note 29 supra. See also
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (application of the substantial
evidence test) ; NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (misapplication of law by Board).
Additionally, even if the Act were not designed specifically to prevent helplessness, it is the court's duty to ensure that the statute remains viable to carry out
its announced purposes. Therefore, balancing of economic power is seemingly demanded
by section 8(a) (1) and arguably by section 8(a) (3).
Published
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did not weigh the lockout against the other weapons at the union's disposal, the court did use this alternative balancing approach to find that the
employer's action did not render the union helpless to combat its effect.
However, the argument could be made in response that since a lockout with
the use of replacements forecloses the opportunity of the workers to earn
their wages, and for the most part shifts the cost of the lockout to the
employees without inflicting a corresponding detriment - loss of profit upon the employer, 5 such a tactic has an unacceptable, chilling effect on
employees' section 7 rights. Under existing law, the employer has an
ability to offset the impact of the union's strike by substituting either
temporary or permanent replacements. 6 6 In contrast, if the employer
initiates the shutdown via a lockout and is permitted to hire replacements,
the union is without a corresponding weapon to combat this employer right.
However, this argument ignores the fact that even if there is a technical
imbalance in the parties' respective bargaining positions, the union may
prevent the employer's realization of its advantage by picketing.6 7
Since the strength of the employer's bargaining position can be tempered by this right of the union to picket, it appears that the employer's
ability to use replacements during a lockout does not amount to "inherently
destructive" conduct. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the
intent of the Act is merely to provide a framework within which the
parties may freely act in their own interests, and not to disturb the interplay of the bargaining process.68 Given this interpretation, allowing the
employer to hire replacements during a lockout merely tends to equalize
the position of the parties. If the employer were not to have this right,
the union could stall negotiations so as to choose the point in the bargain65. It is obvious, however, that the employer's profits normally will be reduced
due to the reduction in efficiency resulting from the lockout of regular employees. See
486 F.2d at 846 n.14.
66. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The employer may
secure either temporary or permanent replacements if the work stoppage is unioninitiated. Cf. id. On the other hand, if the stoppage is employer-initiated, the employer
may now, as the instant decision permits, secure temporary replacements. If an
employer hires permanent replacements for his locked out regular employees, he may
be held to have violated sections 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (1) of the Act. See Schatzki,
supra note 63, at 504.
67. While union picketing may or may not directly affect the decision of replacement labor to serve the locking out employer, the ancillary effects of picketing may be
sufficient to cause the employer to accede to the union's demands. For a survey of
picketing, the forms it has taken, and an implicit indication of their impact, see THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, ch. 12 (C. Morris ed. 1971). Union picketing, while subject
to regulation, has been recognized as a constitutionally protected right. See Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
In addition, one of the rights guaranteed to employees by section 7 is the ability "to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection .

. . ."

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).

This language can be con-

strued to show a legislative intent on the part of Congress to protect peaceful picketing.
Cf. NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1964) ; NLRB v. Teamsters
Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
68. See Oberer, supra note 26, at 499. The Supreme Court has specifically recognized that sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) were intended only to provide an environment within which bargaining could exist, not the content of the employment relationship which emerges therefrom. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss6/3
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ing process at which cessation of operations would be most effective, and
thereby force the employer to choose instituting a lockout without replacements, agreeing to the union's terms, or waiting until the union actually
struck and then using replacements.6 9 If the enterprise were a seasonal
one, as in the instant case, the union more readily could coerce the employer into acceding to its demands. Such a result appears to be contrary
to the intent of the Act because it would substantially adjust the balance
of power rather than maintain a neutral framework within which bargaining could take place. If the enterprise involved were not a seasonal one, it
would matter little to either the union or the employer when a strike/lockout were called. As a policy matter, there seems to exist no reason why
seasonal employers should be more at the mercy of a strike than non-seasonal ones; and, indeed, since the Supreme Court has seen fit to provide employers with the lockout device, they should not be refused its effective use.
The denial by the Supreme Court in American Ship Building of the
Board's authority to engage in this type of balancing of economic strengths
was one part of the trend away from permitting the Board such power. 70
By both limiting the Board's right to balance economic weapons and employing a nebulous test of what is "inherently destructive," the Court has
taken power unto itself at the Board's expense. One possible purpose
behind this action is that of improving the ability of the Court to keep
the Board within the bounds of its statutory delegation of power. 71 If the
statement of standards used in gauging whether employer conduct is
"inherently destructive" is general, it will be said more easily by a reviewing court that the Board has made an error of law in interpreting the
statute it administers. Since courts, rather than administrative agencies,
have traditionally performed the judicial functions of interpreting statutes
and balancing competing interests in light of underlying statutory policies,
there clearly was a rational basis for the Court's pronouncement of broad
parameters of law and its leaving to the Board the task of administering
the Act within those confines.
Given the fact that in categorizing employer conduct as "inherently
destructive," there is actually, if not semantically, a balancing of relative
economic powers, as demonstrated in Inter-CollegiatePress, the real issue
involved, unarticulated if not unrecognized by the courts, is not whether
69. Note that the union as well as the employer is under a duty to bargain in
good faith. See note 1 supra.
70. Balancing had been expressly approved in NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449, 353
U.S. 87, 96 (1957), but was later rejected in NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union,
361 U.S. 477 (1960), wherein the Board was denied the power to "pick . . . and
choos[e] which economic devices of labor and management shall be branded as unlawful." Id. at 498. Accord, Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
But see NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 39 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. As stated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Brown, 280 U.S. 278 (1965) :
Reviewing courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance
of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate
or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute. Such review is
always proper within the judicial province, and courts would abdicate their responsibility
if they did
not fully
review
suchSchool
administrative
decisions.
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